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Abstract—Ridesharing allows multiple persons to share one vehicle for their trips instead of using multiple vehicles. Ridesharing can
reduce the number of vehicles in the street, which consequently can reduce air pollution, traffic congestion, and transportation cost.
However, ridesharing organization requires passengers to report sensitive location information about their trips to a trip organizing
server (TOS) which creates a serious privacy issue. The existing ridesharing organization schemes are neither flexible nor scalable in
the sense that they require a driver and a rider to have exactly the same trip to share a ride, and they are inefficient if applied to large
geographic areas. In this paper, we propose two efficient privacy-preserving ridesharing organization schemes for Non-transferable
Ridesharing Service (NRS) and Transferable Ridesharing Service (TRS). In NRS, a rider shares a ride from his/her trip’s start to the
destination with only one driver, whereas, in TRS, a rider can transfer between multiple drivers while en route until he reaches his
destination. In the proposed schemes, the ridesharing area is divided into a number of small geographic areas, called cells, and each
cell has a unique identifier. Each driver/rider should encrypt his/her trip’s data with modified kNN encryption scheme, and send an
encrypted ridesharing offer/request to the TOS. In NRS scheme, Bloom filters are used to represent the trip information compactly
before encryption. Then, the TOS can measure the similarity of the encrypted trips to organize shared rides without revealing either the
users’ identities or the locations. In TRS scheme, drivers report their encrypted routes, and then the TOS builds a directed graph that is
passed to a modified version of Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm to search for an optimal path for rides that can achieve a set of
preferences prescribed by the riders. Although TRS can be used to organize non-transferable trips, performance evaluation shows that
NRS requires less communication overhead than TRS. Our formal privacy proof and analysis demonstrate that the proposed schemes
can preserve users privacy and our experimental results using routes extracted from real maps show that the proposed schemes can
be used efficiently for large cities.
Index Terms—Privacy preservation, operations on encrypted data, cloud security, transferable ridesharing, non-transferable
ridesharing.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
R IDESHARING, also known as carpooling, is a service thatenables multiple persons who have similar trips at the
same time to travel together in one vehicle instead of using
multiple vehicles. It can reduce air pollution and traffic
congestion by reducing the number of vehicles traveling
on the roads. It can also reduce the trip cost by splitting
the cost among several persons. Recently, the popularity of
ridesharing has significantly increased [1]–[8]. As of 2010,
there were at least 613 ridesharing organization platforms
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in North America mostly based on the internet [5], [9],
[10]. Furthermore, government policies have also been made
in many countries to encourage citizens to share rides.
Making High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes are one of
such strategies. It allows the vehicles with more than two
persons on-board to use a privileged lane [11]–[13]. Another
strategy to motivate sharing rides is providing toll discounts
and reimbursements [14].
Through smartphones, GPS systems, and Internet con-
nectivity, organizing shared rides can be greatly facilitated.
Users are required to register with an online platform that
organizes shared rides, and then a user having a vehicle
(driver) and seeking to share a ride with other users (rid-
ers) sends a ridesharing offer to a Trip Organizing Server
(TOS). This offer should include the trip data, such as the
starting location, destination, trip time and route. Also,
riders looking for shared rides should first send ridesharing
requests with similar information to the TOS. The TOS, then,
matches the drivers’ offers with riders’ requests to assign
one or multiple riders to each driver. Nevertheless, the TOS
is run and operated by a private company that may be
interested to collect information about the users’ locations
and activities.
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Different privacy-preserving ridesharing schemes are
proposed in the literature [15]–[21]. However, existing
schemes suffer from the following issues. First, some
schemes [20] and [21] are not efficient when applied to a
large geographic area because the trip data is very large
due to representing each small area in the city, called cell,
in the ridesharing request. Second, the schemes [15]–[21]
are not flexible in the sense that they do not allow the
riders to prescribe their ridesharing preferences, such as
the trip length, transferable/non transferable services, the
maximum number of transfers, etc. Finally, existing schemes
[15]–[21] consider only non-transferable rides and cannot
organize transferable rides. As will be demonstrated in the
performance analysis, transferable rides can increase the
number of served riders, and thus increase vehicle occu-
pancy.
In this paper, we aim to address the issues mentioned
above by proposing two schemes for the organization of
shared rides for non-transferable ridesharing service (NRS)
and transferable ridesharing service (TRS). To the best of our
knowledge, our TRS scheme is the first scheme that offers
transferable ridesharing service. Both schemes enable the
TOS to organize shared rides without knowing any private
information about the users’ locations and identities. In the
NRS scheme, a rider can share a ride with only one driver,
while in TRS, the rider may need to take multiple vehicles
to reach his destination, which can improve the ridesharing
success rate. In the latter case, the rider has to transfer
between multiple drivers during his trip. In our schemes,
the users can select the type of service they need., e.g.,
NRS might be preferable to elderly and disabled people.
Also, some passengers may prefer NRS because it is more
comfortable and if they do not find a trip, they have backup
plans by paying more, e.g., by taking a cab or driving their
cars. Some passengers do not have such backup plans and
they need the most comfortable TRS trip. In TRS, users can
also limit the trip length and the number of transfers of
the trip that is returned by the TOS. In both schemes, the
ridesharing area is divided into cells (geographic regions),
and a unique identification number (ID) is assigned to each
cell as shown in Figure 1.
For NRS organization, riders and drivers should submit
to the TOS binary vectors representing their trip data en-
crypted by a modified kNN encryption scheme [22]. The
modified kNN encryption scheme ensures that each user
in the system (driver/rider) has its own key including the
TOS. Then, the TOS performs similarity measurement on
the encrypted trip vectors to organize shared rides without
learning any location information to preserve users’ privacy.
In addition, only the TOS can compute the similarty of any
two ciphertexts. A Bloom filter [23] is used to compactly
store the trip data to reduce the communication overhead
and create the binary vector needed for the kNN similarity
measurement. On the other hand, in TRS, drivers should
report the encryption of the individual cells on their routes.
Then, the TOS builds a directed graph using the drivers’
individual cells. After that, a modified Dijkstra’s searching
algorithm [24] is used to search this graph to determine the
route that can achieve the rider’s preferences, constraints,
and requirements without learning the identities or the
locations of the users. For example, a rider can request a
Fig. 1: Dividing a ridesharing area into cells.
trip with the minimum number of cells regardless of the
number of transfers.
Compared to the existing schemes, our contributions can
be summarized as follows.
• Transferable and non-transferable rides. Two privacy-
preserving ridesharing organization schemes are pro-
posed TRS and NRS. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work that proposes the privacy-preserving
ridesharing organization for the two cases. Although
the focus of our schemes is on organizing shared rides
(carpooling), the proposed schemes can also be adapted
to work with ride-hailing services [25] and [26], such as
Uber and Lyft.
• Efficiency and scalability. Our schemes use secure and
lightweight operations to enable TOS to efficiently find
the riders and the drivers who can share rides in case
of large cities. In addition, our schemes require low
communication overhead.
• Formal proof and analysis. We provide a formal proof and
privacy analysis for the proposed schemes to demon-
strate that NRS and TRS can organize shared rides
without disclosing locations and identities information.
• Simulation with real maps. Proposed schemes were im-
plemented with MATLAB using real map and routes.
The experimental results demonstrate that the com-
munication and storage overheads are acceptable, and
our schemes are scalable and can be used efficiently in
cases of large cities. In addition, Although TRS can be
used to organize both transferable and non-transferable
rides, The NRS provides better efficiency in terms of the
communication overhead for non-transferable services.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
The network and threat models are introduced in Section
2. Preliminaries and design goals are given in Section ??.
The proposed schemes are presented in Section 3. Privacy
analysis is discussed in Section 4. Performance evaluations
are given in Section 5. The related works are presented in
Section 6. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2 SYSTEM MODEL AND DESIGN GOALS
2.1 Network Model
As shown in Figure 2, the considered network model con-
sists of an offline Trusted Authority (TA), drivers, riders and
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Fig. 2: Considered network model.
a TOS. The TA is responsible for generating and distributing
unique secret keys to drivers, riders, and the TOS. Drivers
and riders can use a smartphone application to send their
encrypted trip data to the TOS through the internet. The
TOS should execute one of the proposed schemes based on
the drivers ’and riders’ preferences and connects the drivers
and riders that can share rides. Figure 1 shows the rideshar-
ing area considered in our simulation. To achieve forward
and backward privacy as will be discussed in section 4, the
cell’s identifiers should frequently change (e.g., every day)
so that the TOS cannot link old trips’ data to the new data
to obtain side information.
2.2 Threat Model
In our schemes, we consider the trusted authority is trust-
worthy and cannot be compromised. Additionally, we con-
sider that drivers, riders, and the TOS are "honest-but-
curious", i.e., they follow the proposed schemes and do not
aim to disrupt their operation, however, they are curious
to learn useful information about users, such as the trip’s
pick-up/drop-off locations and times. The attackers are also
interested in learning the identities of users who share rides
with each other. In addition, we assume that the attackers
can be internal or external. The TOS and legitimate users can
be internal attackers. External attackers may try to pretend
to be a driver/rider and send offers/requests to the TOS to
expose the privacy of other riders/drivers. They can also
launch attacks like eavesdropping and impersonation, etc.,
to learn sensitive information about the users’ locations,
routes, and identities. In our schemes, TOS is a third party
known to all riders, drivers, and TA.
2.3 Design Goals
Our goal is to develop two privacy-preserving ridesharing
organization schemes for NRS and TRS with the following
objectives.
• Transferable and non-transferable services: Non-
transferable service may be preferred by some
users, such as elderly, while, transferable service can
increase the chance of organizing shared rides.
TABLE 1: List of notations and their meanings.
Notation Description
KNT = {M1,M2, N1, . . . , N8} TA Master Secret Matrices for NRS scheme
KT = {V1, V2, T1, . . . , T8} TA Master Secret Matrices for TRS scheme
SNT , ST Splitting Indicator Vector for NRS and TRS
X,Y TOS secrets for NRS
W,Z TOS secrets for TRS
DNSK Driver Secret key in NRS
RNSK Rider Secret key in NRS
DT SK Driver Secret key in TRS
RT SK Rider Secret key in TRS
m Number of bits needed for the Bloom filter
k Number of bits needed to represent an TRS cell
` Number of bits needed to represent time
n Number of bits needed for an TRS vector
Nr Number of riders with each driver in NRS
n_d Number of drivers
k_r Number of riders
Cp, Cd, r, t Pick-up cell, drop-off cell, route, time
I
(Cp)
D , I
(Cd)
D , I
(r)
D , I
(t)
D Driver D: pick-up, drop-off, route and time indices
I
(Cp)
R , I
(Cd)
R , I
(r)
R , I
(t)
R Rider R: pick-up, drop-off, route and time indices
• Efficiency and scalability. The schemes should be efficient
in case of a large ridesharing region (i.e. big cities) and
should process large number of ridesharing requests
quickly.
• User requirements and preferences. Users should be able
to select the type of service (NRS or TRS) and prescribe
their search preference such as trip length, maximum
number of transfers, etc.
• Trip data privacy. The TOS should be able to organize
shared rides without learning the pick-up/drop-off lo-
cations and times or even any road segment in users
trips. Eavesdroppers and malicious users should not be
able to learn any location/time information about other
users’ trips.
• Forward and backward privacy: To prevent the TOS from
inferring incremental side information over time, by
matching the trip’s data sent at different times, the
encrypted trip data sent in a given day cannot be
matched to old or future trips’ data.
• Data linkability: (1) Requests-user un-linkability: Given
different ridesharing requests sent from a user, the TOS
should not learn if these requests are sent from the same
user or not; (2) Driver-rider pair un-linkability: If a driver-
rider pair shares a ride, the TOS should not identify
the same pair when they share rides in the future; (3)
Same requests un-linkability: The TOS should not link
the ridesharing requests (or offers) of the same trip at
different times.
• Users’ anonimity: The TOS should ensure that the
received requests/offers are coming from legitimate
users, but, it should not be able to reveal the real
identity of the users from the credentials they use for
authentication or the locations they visit.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDAPLE AND SECURE COMPUTING, VOL. XX, NO. XX, NOVEMBER 2018 4
3 PROPOSED SCHEMES
This section presents the details of the proposed schemes.
For better readability, the main notations used throughout
this section are given in Table 1
3.1 System Bootstrap
The TA chooses two sets of keys as master secret
keys, KNT for NRS and KT for TRS, where KNT =
{M1,M2, N1, . . . , N8} and KT = {V1, V2, T1, . . . , T8}. SNT
and ST are binary vectors used as splitting indicators during
the encryption process, as will be explained later in this
section. The size of SNT is m, where m is the size of the
binary vector to be encrypted in NRS scheme. All other
elements in the set KNT are m × m invertible matrices.
Similarly, the size of ST is n, where n is the size of the binary
vector to be encrypted in TRS scheme and all other elements
in the set, KT , are n×n invertible matrices of random secret
numbers.
Then, the TA generates the TOS’ secret keys. The keys
consist of four random matrices X,Y,W , and Z . The two
matrices X and Y are to be used in NRS while W and Z are
to be used in TRS. Note that, X and Y are of size m ×m,
while W and Z are of size n× n.
Each user in the system can play the role of a driver or
a rider. Also, each user can offer/request non-transferable
or transferable service. Using the master secret sets and the
TOS secrets, the TA computes unique secret keys for each
user in the system as follows.
1) Driver in NRS Secret Key:
DNSK = {Y -1N -11 AN , Y -1N -12 BN , Y -1N -13 AN ,
Y -1N -14 BN , Y
-1N -15 CN , Y
-1N -16 DN ,
Y -1N -17 CN , Y
-1N -18 DN}
where AN , BN , CN , and DN are random and invertible
matrices of size m×m, such that AN +BN = M -11 , and
CN + DN = M
-1
2 . Note that, DNSK key set has eight
elements where each element is a matrix of size m×m.
2) Rider in NRS Secret Key:
RNSK = {ENN1X, ENN2X, FNN3X, FNN4X,
GNN5X, GNN6X, HNN7X, HNN8X}
where EN , FN , GN , and HN are random and invertible
matrices of size m ×m, such that EN + FN = M1, and
GN + HN = M2. Note that, RNSK key set has eight
elements where each element is a matrix of size m×m.
3) Driver in TRS Secret Key:
DT SK = {Z -1T -11 AT , Z -1T -12 BT , Z -1T -13 AT ,
Z -1T -14 BT , Z
-1T -15 CT , Z
-1T -16 DT ,
Z -1T -17 CT , Z
-1T -18 DT }
where AT , BT , CT , and DT are random and invertible
matrices of size n × n, such that AT + BT = V -11 , and
CT + DT = V
-1
2 . Note that, DT SK key set has eight
elements where each element is a matrix of size n× n.
4) Rider in TRS mode Secret Key:
RT SK = {ETT1W, ETT2W, FTT3W, FTT4W,
GTT5W, GTT6W, HTT7W, HTT8W}
Primary Route
Secondary Route
(a) MP/MD (b) MP/RD (c) MP/ED
Pick-up
Area
Start End
Drop-off
Area
AV drive itself back
Primary Drop-off
Fig. 3: Ridesharing cases in NRS scheme.
where ET , FT , GT , and HT are random and invertible
matrices of size n × n, such that ET + FT = V1, and
GT + HT = V2. Note that, RT SK key set has eight
elements where each element is a matrix of size n× n.
In addition to the four key sets, each user receives from
the TA a set of certified pseudonymous that are used for
authentication with the TOS. In addition, each user should
receive the two vectors SNT and ST .
3.2 Non-transferable Ride Sharing Organization
3.2.1 Overview
The original version of kNN encryption scheme was pro-
posed in [27], and we modified it in [22]. In the modified
version, we can measure the similarity of the indices sub-
mitted from the riders with indices submitted from different
drivers, while the original version can only measure the
similarity between the riders’ indices and one driver’s in-
dices. The modified kNN technique is used for matching
the riders’ requests indices with drivers’ offers indices to
organize the shared rides. In the proposed scheme, each
driver creates an encrypted ridesharing offer, and each rider
creates an encrypted ridesharing request. The TOS receives
these offers and requests and computes their similarity to
organize non-transferable shared rides without learning any
location information. Finally, the TOS connects the drivers
and riders that can share rides.
3.2.2 Ride-Sharing Cases
Three different ridesharing cases are considered for the NRS
scheme as shown in Figure 3.
• Matched Pick-up and Matched Drop-off (MP/MD). The
driver decides the pick-up and drop-off areas of the
riders. These areas are in the surrounding of the driver’s
start and end locations. As shown in Figure 3(a), the
destination of the rider lies within the drop-off area
defined by the driver.
• Matched Pick-up and on-Route Drop-off (MP/RD). The
driver decides the pick-up area like MP/MD case. For
the drop off, the driver can share a ride with a rider
whose drop-off location is different from his trip’s end
location, but it lies on the surrounding of his route. As
shown in Figure 3(b), the destination of the rider lies on
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the driver’s route. In this case, the vehicle diverts from
its route to drop off the rider(s) and then it drives back
to the driver’s route.
• Matched Pick-up and Extended Drop-off (MP/ED). The
driver decides the pick-up area like MP/MD and
MP/RD cases. In this case, the drop-off location of the
rider does not lie on the surrounding area of his driver’s
route or end location. As shown in Figure 3(c), the des-
tination of the driver lies on the rider’s route. Therefore,
the vehicle first drops the driver off, then it delivers the
rider to his destination, and finally, it drives itself back to
the driver’s location. This case is not possible in human-
driven cars unless there is a human driver who can drive
the car back to the driver after delivering the rider.
Note that, these ridesharing cases consider that the riders
and drivers have the same pick-up area but they can be
easily extended so that the driver can pick-up riders at any
point on his route.
3.2.3 Driver’s Offer Submission
Each driver should represent his pick-up area, drop-off area,
and his route by a list of cell IDs. For example, Figure 1
shows a user’s route that can be represented by the follow-
ing set of cell IDs {C7, C17, C27, C26, C25, C35, C45, C55}.
The driver creates a ridesharing offer that has four en-
crypted vectors referred to as indices. These indices contain
driver’s trip data including pick-up area index I(Cp)D , drop-
off area index I(Cd)D , trip route index I
(r)
D , and pick-up time
index I(t)D .
Figure 4 shows the process of computing the trip route
index I(r)D by the driver. First, the route cells are passed to a
Bloom filter building algorithm to generate a binary column
vector P (r) of sizem. Note that, the algorithm is modified to
guarantee that the α hash values of each cell ID are distinct.
For example, if Hi(C) = Hj(C), a counter is concatenated
to C such that Hi(C, counter) 6= Hj(C, counter), where
counter is the first number that can make the two hash
values different [23]. Then, the driver uses the key set
DNSK, defined in subsection 3.1, to encrypt P (r) using
our modified kNN encryption scheme [22]. For encryption,
the driver uses SNT to split P (r) into two random column
vectors p′(r) and p′′(r) of the same size as P (r). The splitting
is done as follows. If the jth bit of SNT is zero, then, p′(r)(j)
and p′′(r)(j) are set similar to P (r)(j), while if it is one,
p′(r)(j) and p′′(r)(j) are set to two random numbers such
that their summation is equal to P (r)(j). After splitting P (r),
the encrypted index I(r)D can be computed using the secret
key DNSK and the vectors p′(r), p′′(r) as follows
I
(r)
D =
[
Y -1N -11 ANp
′(r); Y -1N -12 BNp
′(r); Y -1N -13 ANp
′(r);
Y -1N -14 BNp
′(r); Y -1N -15 CNp
′′(r); Y -1N -16 DNp
′′(r);
Y -1N -17 CNp
′′(r); Y -1N -18 DNp
′′(r)
]
(1)
where I(r)D is a column vector of size 8 elements, and each
element is a column vector of size m. Note that, every time
the same vector is encrypted, the ciphertext looks different
due to the random numbers used in creating p′(r) and p′′(r).
{C7, C17, . . . , C55}Route Cells:
Bloom Filter
Building Algorithm
Splitting
Encryption
I
(r)
D
SNT
DNSK
P (r)
p′(r), p′′(r)
Fig. 4: Route Data Encryption Process.
Using the same process, the pick-up and drop-off in-
dices, I(Cp)D and I
(Cd)
D , can be computed by passing the
pick-up cells and drop-off cells to the Bloom filter algorithm,
and encrypting the Bloom filter vector. To generate the pick-
up time index I(t)D , we use a binary vector where each bit
represents one-time slot in the day such that all the bit
values are zeros except the bit corresponding to the trip
start time that should store one. Then, this binary vector
is encrypted in the same manner to obtain I(t)D .
Along with the indices, the driver should send to the
TOS the maximum number of riders with whom he can
share rides. Also, the driver should encrypt his contact
information and send it to the TOS along an anonymous
signature. Moreover, the driver can select some of the
preferred ridesharing cases. For example, he might prefer
only MP/RD case so that riders can not know his final
destination, he might prefer only MP/MD case so that he
never stops during the trip, or he can select more than one
ridesharing case.
3.2.4 Rider’s Request Submission
Each rider should generate a ridesharing request that has
the pick-up location index I(Cp)R , drop-off location index
I
(Cd)
R , trip route index I
(r)
R , and pick-up time index I
(t)
R .
More specifically, to compute I(Cp)R , the rider’s pick-up
cell ID is passed to the Bloom filter building algorithm
to generate a binary row vector Q(Cp). Since the rider’s
pick-up location is one cell, the Bloom filter vector contains
exactly α bits set to 1. Then, SNT is used to split Q(Cp)
into two random row vectors q′(Cp) and q′′(Cp) of the same
size as Q(Cp). The splitting process is opposite to that of
the drivers. If the jth bit of SNT is one, then, q′(Cp)(j)
and q′′(Cp)(j) are set similar to Q(Cp)(j), while if it is zero,
q′(Cp)(j) and q′′(Cp)(j) are set to two random numbers such
that their summation is equal to Q(Cp)(j). Then, the rider
can compute the encrypted index I(Cp)R using the key set
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RNSK and the vectors q′(Cp) and q′′(Cp) as follows.
I
(Cp)
R =
[
q′(Cp)ENN1X, q′(Cp)ENN2X, q′(Cp)FNN3X,
q′(Cp)FNN4X, q′′(Cp)GNN5X, q′′(Cp)GNN6X,
q′′(Cp)HNN7X, q′′(Cp)HNN8X
]
(2)
where I(Cp)R is a row vector with size 8 elements, and each
element is a row vector of size m. Using of a similar process,
the rider can generate I(t)R , I
(Cd)
R , and I
(r)
R , for the pick-
up time, drop-off location, and route respectively. Also, the
rider should encrypt his contact information and send it to
the TOS along with an anonymous signature.
3.2.5 Organizing Shared Rides
First, the TOS must ensure that the received offers and
requests are coming from legitimate users. This can be
achieved by verifying the received signatures associated
with each offer/request. In addition, the TOS multiplies the
elements of the offers’ indices by Y and elements of the
requests’ indices by X -1 to remove its secrets Y -1 and X
from the offers and requests respectively. Thus, only the TOS
can match drivers’ and riders’ indices because its secrets X
and Y are needed to match the indices.
After that, the TOS starts to organize the shared rides
as follows. The TOS first measures the similarity between
the indices of the riders’ and the drivers’ pick-up time by
computing a dot product operation between I(t)R and I
(t)
D .
Since only one bit is set to one in the time vector, the
dot product result is one if and only if the driver and the
rider start their trips within the same time slot. In this case,
the TOS measures the similarity between the rider and the
driver pick-up indices (I(Cp)R and I
(Cp)
D ) as follows.
I
(Cp)
R X
-1 · Y I(Cp)D =
q′(Cp)ENANp′(Cp) + q′(Cp)ENBNp′(Cp)
+ q′(Cp)FNANp′(Cp) + q′(Cp)FNBNp′(Cp)
+ q′′(Cp)GNCNp′′(Cp) + q′′(Cp)GNDNp′′(Cp)
+ q′′(Cp)HNCNp′′(Cp) + q′′(Cp)HNDNp′′(Cp) (3)
= q′(Cp)(EN + FN )(AN +BN )p′(Cp)
+ q′′(Cp)(GN +HN )(CN +DN )p′′(Cp)
= q′(Cp)p′(Cp) + q′′(Cp)p′′(Cp)
= Q(Cp) · P (Cp)
Since the rider’s pick-up location index I(Cp)R stores only
one cell, the Bloom filter contains exactly α bits set to one.
These α bits correspond to the α locations pointed by the
hash functions used by the Bloom filter. Therefore, if the
measured similarity between I(Cp)R and I
(Cp)
D is exactly α,
then, the rider’s pick-up location lies within the driver’s
pick-up area. On the other hand, if the measured similarity
is less than α, then the rider’s pick-up location lies out-
side the driver’s pick-up area, and thus ridesharing is not
possible between this driver and that rider and TOS has
to try other users. On the other hand, if the pick-up time
and location are matched, the TOS proceeds based on the
requested ridesharing case(s), as follows.
• Organizing MP/MD shared ride. As shown in Figure 3(a),
the TOS measures the similarity of the rider’s drop-off
index I(Cd)R and the driver’s drop-off index I
(Cd)
D . If the
result is α, then an MP/MD ridesharing is possible.
• Organizing MP/RD shared ride. As shown in Figure 3(b),
the TOS measures the similarity of the rider’s drop-off
index I(Cd)R and the driver’s route index I
(r)
D . If the result
is α, then an MP/RD ridesharing is possible.
• Organizing MP/ED shared ride. As shown in Figure 3(c),
the TOS measures the similarity of the driver’s drop-off
index I(Cd)D and the rider’s route index I
(r)
R . If the result
is α, then an MP/ED ridesharing is possible.
Consider that the driver requests to share rides with Nr
riders.After TOS finds at most Nr riders who can share ride
with the driver, it connects them.
3.3 Transferable Ride Sharing Organization
3.3.1 Overview
The proposed privacy-preserving TRS scheme uses our
modified version of the kNN encryption scheme [22] and
a modified version of Dijkstra shortest path algorithm.
Figure 6 shows flowchart for the TRS scheme. First, each
driver creates an encrypted ridesharing offer that includes
the individual cells on his trip and sends the offer to the
TOS. The TOS should first use the drivers’ offers to build
a directed graph required for organizing shared rides. Each
rider creates an encrypted ridesharing request that includes
the pick-up and drop-off cell IDs. In addition, the TOS
determines the weights of the directed graph by using the
ridesharing preferences sent by the rider. The TOS uses the
riders’ requests to search the directed graph to find the path
that can satisfy the riders’ requirements without learning
any location information. Finally, TOS connects the drivers
and riders. In addition, TOS should make any necessary
updates to the directed graph, e.g., if an offer is served, its
cells should be removed from the graph. The graph update
process does not need much computations and does not
require building the whole graph again.
3.3.2 Data Representation
As in NRS scheme, in TRS, the ridesharing area is divided
into geographic regions, called cells, each having a unique
identifier Ci, as illustrated in Figure 1. Unlike NRS, each cell
in the driver’s route is represented individually by a binary
vector that has the location and time components as shown
in Figure 5. The location is represented by the cell identifier
while the time component is the expected time the user will
be in the cell. We define k as the number of bits that are
needed to represent each cell identifier in the ridesharing
area. For the location component in the cell vector, 2k bits
are used to represent the location cell identifier in binary
and its complement as shown if Figure 5. The complement
value is used so that the number of common ones between
any two spatially matched cell vectors is fixed value, k.
For the time component in the cell vector, ` bits are used
to represent the whole day (i.e., 24 hours), where each bit
represents a specific time interval. Each user should set
the bit corresponding to the time interval in which he/she
will be in the cell. Hence, any two spatially and temporally
matched cell vectors should have k + 1 common ones.
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Fig. 5: Binary vector of each cell.
System setup
Drivers submit
indices to their trips
Similarity matching and
building a directed graph
Riders submit
indices to their trips Update the directed graph
Determine the weights
of the directed graph
Search for shared ride and
connect matched trip’s users
Fig. 6: Flowchart of the TRS ridesharing organization
scheme.
3.3.3 Driver’s Offer Submission
For each cell Ci in a driver’s route, the driver creates a
binary vector of length n = 2k + ` and encrypts it using
the modified kNN encryption scheme to get an index vector
for each cell in his trip’s route. For each cell, the driver
computes two indices (I(Ci)D+ and I
(Ci)
D− ). The first index I
(Ci)
D+
is encrypted using DT SK and is used to enable riders’
requests to be matched with the driver cell data while the
second index I(Ci)D− is encrypted using RT SK and is used
to enable the TOS to match all the drivers’ trip data to
generate a directed graph required for searching operations.
For generating I(Ci)D+ , the driver uses the binary vector ST
to split each binary cell’s vector denoted as P (Ci) into two
vectors p′(Ci) and p′′(Ci) of the same size. If the jth bit
of ST is zero, then, p′(Ci)(j) and p′′(Ci)(j) are set similar
to P (Ci)(j), while if it is one, p′(Ci)(j) and p′′(Ci)(j) are
set to two random numbers such that their summation
is equal to P (Ci)(j). After splitting P (Ci), the driver uses
p′(Ci), p′′(Ci) and the key set DT SK to compute the index
I
(Ci)
D+ as follows.
I
(Ci)
D+ =
[
Z -1T -11 AT p
′(Ci); Z -1T -12 BT p
′(Ci); Z -1T -13 AT p
′(Ci);
Z -1T -14 BT p
′(Ci); Z -1T -15 CT p
′′(Ci); Z -1T -16 DT p
′′(Ci);
Z -1T -17 CT p
′′(Ci); Z -1T -18 DT p
′′(Ci)
]
(4)
where I(Ci)D+ is a column vector of size 8 elements, and
each element is a column vector of size n. For generating
I
(Ci)
D− , the binary vector ST is used to split the binary cell’s
vector denoted as Q(Ci) into two vectors q′(Ci) and q′′(Ci)
of the same size. The splitting process of Q(Ci) is opposite
to that of P (Ci). If the jth bit of ST is one, then, q′(Ci)(j)
and q′′(Ci)(j) are set similar to Q(Ci)(j), while if it is zero,
q′(Ci)(j) and q′′(Ci)(j) are set to two random numbers such
that their summation is equal to Q(Ci)(j). Then, the driver
can compute the encrypted index I(Ci)D− using the key set
RT SK and the vectors q′(Ci) and q′′(Ci) as follows
I
(Ci)
D− =
[
q′(Ci)ETT1W, q′(Ci)ETT2W, q′(Ci)FTT3W
q′(Ci)FTT4W, q′′(Ci)GTT5W, q′′(Ci)GTT6W,
q′′(Ci)HTT7W, q′′(Ci)HTT8W
] (5)
where ICiD− is a row vector of size 8 elements, and each
element is a row vector of size n. Each driver should
encrypt and send the indices of the individual cells of his
route to the TOS. Other information such as the number
of riders who can share the trip with, and his encrypted
contact information should be sent to the TOS along with
anonymous signature.
3.3.4 Building A Directed Graph
After TOS receives the cell indices of drivers’ routes, it
constructs a directed graph that contains all the cells of all
the drivers without knowing the exact spatial locations of
the cells to preserve privacy.
Given driver h route, where cell j on his/her route is
denoted as Dk,j , the TOS builds the directed graph by
measuring the similarity of cells’ indices. To do this, the
following two types of graph edges are used:
1) Route Edges. These edges are unidirectional and con-
nects different cells that belong to the same driver.
2) Transfer Edges. These edges are bidirectional and con-
nects the matched cells of different drivers. In these
cells, the drivers will be in the same time at the same
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(a) Adding route edges.
Driver1
Driver2
D1,1 D1,2 D1,3 D1,4 D1,5
D2,1 D2,2 D2,3 D2,4 D2,5
(b) Cells matching.
Route Edge
Similarity Check
Transfer Edge
D1,1 D1,2 D1,3 D1,4 D1,5
D2,1 D2,2 D2,3 D2,4 D2,5
(c) Connecting two routes.
Fig. 7: Similarity measurement and building the graph. (a)
Two drivers routes with route edges added. (b) The cell
matching between D1,3 cell and all cells of driver two’s
route. (c) The connected graph of the two drivers after
adding bidirectional edges between matched cells. Note
that, D1,3 and D2,2 have the same physical location, sim-
ilarly, D1,4 and D2,3.
location and thus a rider can transfer from one driver
to another.
The TOS adds a route edge between any two consecutive
cells Dh,j and Dh,j+1 of driver h. As shown in Figure 7(a),
there are two drivers each having five cells in his route and
the route edges are added between the same driver cells.
After adding route edges, TOS measures the similarity of
every driver’s cell to all other drivers’ cells in order to add
transfer edges to the graph. Figure 7(b) shows that TOS
measures the similarity of driver one’s cell three (D1,3) and
all the indices of driver two. If any of the matching result
is exactly equal to k + 1, it means that both drivers will be
in the same cell at the same time. In that case, TOS adds a
bidirectional edge (transfer edge) between the two cells. As
shown in Figure 7(c), TOS finishes adding all the transfer
edges to connect the two routes. After connecting the two
routes, a third driver’s route can be added to Figure 7(c)
graph using the same procedure and the directed graph is
completed after connecting the routes of all drivers. Note
that, even if a graph is constructed and a new driver sends
a route, it is easy to add this route to the constructed graph
without building the whole graph.
3.3.5 Rider’s Request Submission
For the rider, his trip data contains only two cells; one cell
for pick-up Cp and another cell for drop-off Cd. Using the
key set RT SK, the rider can compute two indices I(Cp)R
and I(Cd)R and send them to the TOS. Also, the rider should
encrypt his contact information and sends it to the TOS
along with an anonymous signature.
3.3.6 Organization of Shared Rides
Graph Weights Based on Rider’s Preferences. Since riders
have different requirements and needs, our scheme allows
them to prescribe their preferences in the shared rides. The
riders’ preferences are used by the TOS to determine the
graph’s weights so that the optimal search result is returned
to the rider. The number of cells traveled by the rider and the
number of transfers done by the rider are used to prescribe
the rider’s preferences. Riders’ preferences are given as
follows.
1) Minimum number of cells (Minc). In this preference,
rider requires a trip with the minimum number of
cells (shortest distance). If TOS finds different trips that
can satisfy Minc, it returns the trip that has the least
number of transfers.
2) Maximum number of cells (Maxc). In this preference,
rider requires TOS to return a trip that has a number of
cells that are less than a threshold value Maxc. If TOS
finds different trips that can satisfy Maxc, it returns the
trip that has the least number of transfers.
3) Minimum number of transfers (Mint). In this preference,
rider requires a trip that has the minimum number of
transfers. This option may be preferable by elder people
or the people with disability on wheelchairs. If TOS
finds different trips that can satisfy Mint, it returns the
trip that has the least number of cells.
4) Maximum number of transfers (Maxt). In this preference,
the rider requires TOS to return only the trips that has
a number of transfers that is less than a threshold value
Maxt. If TOS finds different trips that can satisfyMaxt,
it returns the trip that has the least number of cells.
In addition, any combinations of the aforementioned
preferences can be used such as, minimum number of
cells and transfers (Minc,t), minimum number of trans-
fers and maximum number of cells (Mint,Maxc), Mini-
mum number of cells and maximum number of transfers
(Minc,Maxt), and maximum number of cells and maxi-
mum number of transfers (Maxc,t).
When TOS receives the rider’s data, it uses the rider’s
preference to set the weight of each edge in the directed
graph. For Minc and Maxc, the weights of route edges are
set to one and the weights for transfer edges should be zero
as they occur within the same cell, however, in order to
eliminate zero weight cycles in the graph, a small value,
, is used. On the other hand, for Mint and Maxt, the
weight of transfer edges is one, while the weight of route
edges is . For the other combinations of the aforementioned
preferences, a weighting process similar to that described
for the above two preferences is used. After determining
the weight of each edge in the graph based on the rider’s
preference, the TOS is ready to run the search algorithm.
Figure 8 gives an example for the different options
supported by the proposed scheme that satisfy all the
requirements and needs of the riders. In this figure,
three drivers’ routes are connected through a directed
graph. It assumes that one rider requests a ride from
the source node D1,1 to the destination node D2,4 or
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Minc,t : D1,1, D1,2, D1,3, D2,1, D2,2, D2,3, D2,4
Destinations
Route Edge
Transfer Edge
Fig. 8: Examples of ridesharing preferences assuming three
drivers and one rider request from node D1,1 with either
node D2,4 or D3,5 as destination. Note that, two solution
exist for Mint with different number of cells.
D3,5. Note that, nodes D2,4 and D3,5 have the same
physical cell. If the rider requests Minc, the TOS returns
{D1,1, D1,2, D1,3, D2,1, D2,2, D2,3, D2,4}, for Mint the
result is either {D1,1, D1,2, D1,3, D2,1, D2,2, D2,3, D2,4} or
{D1,1, D1,2, D1,3, D3,1, D3,2, D3,3, D3,4, D3,5} because both
of these paths have only one transfer, and for Minc,t the
TOS returns {D1,1, D1,2, D1,3, D2,1, D2,2, D2,3, D2,4}.
Search the Graph. To organize shared rides, TOS should
first search the directed graph to find the route and hence
the drivers that the rider will share the ride with. Compared
to other graph searching algorithms that target the shortest
paths between cells in a weighted graphs, Dijkstra’s algo-
rithm is the fastest single-source multi destination shortest
path algorithm with searching complexity of O(v log(v))
[24], where v is the number of vertices in the graph.
We modified Dijkstra’s searching algorithm [24] to en-
able TOS find all shortest paths with equal cost which
the existing Dijkstra’s algorithm cannot find. The original
algorithm returns only one shortest path, whereas in our
scheme, some riding preferences need the whole set of
shortest paths resulted from a certain request. For example,
in Minc,t, we need to know the whole set of the paths
that satisfy the minimum number of cells and the whole
set of paths that satisfy the minimum number of transfers
to take the intersection between them to get the paths that
can achieve minimum numbers of cells and transfers. Given
a rider’s source and destination nodes, the modified algo-
rithm can find all the shortest paths connecting them on the
graph. The modified algorithm is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
In order to organize shared rides that can satisfy the
preference of the riders, TOS matches the startup cell of the
rider to all the cells in the graph to determine the possible
source cells. The same procedure should be performed using
the rider’s destination cell to find the possible destination
cells. Note that, possible source/destination cells have the
same physical location, however, they belong to different
drivers. As an example for similarity matching, consider
the TOS measures the similarity of an arbitrary cell Ca
encrypted usingRT SK and has an index I(Ca)R and another
Algorithm 1: Modified Dijkstra Algorithm
Data: Graph,source
Result: dist,pred
1 PQ=PiriorityQueue
2 for each vertex v in Graph do
3 dist[v]←∞
4 pred[v]← [ ]
5 end
6 dist[source]← 0
7 PQ.insert(source, 0)
8 while not PQ.empty() do
9 u← PQ.pop()
10 for each neighbor v of u do
11 if dist[v] > dist[u] + Length(u, v) then
12 dist[v]← dist[u] + Length(u, v)
13 PQ.insert(v, dist(v))
14 pred[v]← u
15 else if dist[v] == dist[u] + Length(u, v)
then
16 pred[v].add(u)
17 end
18 end
cell Cb encrypted using DT SK and has an index I(Cb)D . The
similarity measurement can be computed as follows
I
(Cb)
R W
-1 · ZI(Cb)D =
q′(Ca)ETAT p′(Cb) + q′(Ca)ETBT p′(Cb)
+ q′(Ca)FTAT p′(Cb) + q′(Ca)FTBT p′(Cb)
+ q′′(Ca)GTCT p′′(Cb) + q′′(Ca)GTDT p′′(Cb) (6)
+ q′′(Ca)HTCT p′′(Cb) + q′′(Ca)HTDT p′′(Cb)
= q′(Ca)(ET + FT )(AT +BT )p′(Cb)
+ q′′(Ca)(GT +HT )(CT +DT )p′′(Cb)
= q′(Ca)p′(Cb) + q′′(Ca)p′′(Cb)
= Q(Ca) · P (Cb)
Then, TOS uses the modified Dijkstra’s searching algo-
rithm to find all paths between source and destination that
satisfy the required preferences. Finally, the TOS should
return the contact information of the riders/drivers and
the ciphertext of the cells of the transfers. In addition, TOS
updates the directed graph by removing the edges of the
associated offers if they have exhausted their ridesharing
capacity.
4 PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss how our schemes can achieve the
privacy-preservation goals mentioned in subsection 2.3. For
the following formal proof, we followed the same model in
[28] to prove the security of our schemes.
Theorem 1. The TOS can organize shared NRS and TRS rides
without learning any sensitive information about the trip’s data.
Proof: We provide a proof for the theorem to the NRS
scheme and by the same analogy the proof can be used for
TRS. First, we define some notations:
History. For a set of drivers’ routes R, the history is a
set of indices I = {I(r1)D1 , . . . , I
(rn_d)
Dn_d
} over R and a set of
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riders pick-up locations IP = {I(Cp1 )R1 , I
(Cp2 )
R2
, . . . , I
(Cpk_r )
Rk_r
},
denoted asH = (I, IP), where n_d and k_r are the number
of drivers and riders, respectively.
Trace. A trace reflects the knowledge inferred by the
TOS over the history H , denoted as Tr(H), such as the
search and access patterns, where Tr(H) is defined over
all the riders’ pick-up locations of H , such as Tr(H) =
{Tr(I(Cp1 )R1 ), T r(I
(Cp2 )
R2
), . . . , T r(I
(Cpk_r )
Rk_r
)}
View. It represents the perception of the TOS. It is the
combination of the encrypted history and its trace, denoted
as V (I, IP , T r(H)).
Consider a simulator S that can generate a false view
V ′ that is indistinguishable from V by doing the following
steps.
1) S generates a master secret key sk′ = K ′NT .
2) S generates a set of random routes R′ = {r′1, . . . , r′n_d}
such that |ri| = |r′i|, 1 ≤ i ≤ n_d, r′i = {C ′1, C ′2, . . . },
and |ri| is the length of the route.
3) S generates a set of pick-up cells IP′ =
{I ′(Cp1 )R1 , I
′(Cp2 )
R2
, . . . , I
′(Cpk_r )
Rk_r
}, where I ′(Cpj )Rj ∈ {0, 1}m
is generated as follows by replacing each Cpj it with
C ′pj and generate I
′(Cpj )
Rj
. Note that I
′(Cpj )
Rj
is a random
copy of I
(Cpj )
Rj
.
4) S generates a set of m-bit vectors denoted as indices
I ′ = {I ′(r1)D1 , . . . , I
′(rn_d)
Dn_d
} as follows. For each cell Cj ∈
city, if Cj ⊂ ri and 1 ≤ i ≤ n_d, add C ′j to I ′(ri)Di . Note
that I ′(ri)Di is a random copy of I
(ri)
Di
.
5) S generates encrypted indices I ′ and trapdoor IP′
using secret sk′.
From the previous construction S has a history H ′ =
(I ′, IP′) with trace Tr(H ′) similar to Tr(H) such that
in no probabilistic polynomial-time (P.P.T.), adversary can
distinguish between the two views V (I, IP , T r(H)) and
V ′(I ′, IP′, T r(H ′)) with non-negligible advantage where
the correctness of the construction implies this conclusion.
In particular, the indistinguishability follows directly from
the semantic security of kNN encryption scheme.
In addition, the random numbers used in kNN encryp-
tion scheme can make the ciphertext of the same data look
different when encrypted multiple times. If a malicious user
intercepts the ciphertext of another user’s trip, he cannot
decrypt it because the secret key set is needed for decryption
and each user has a unique key.
Beside the aforementioned features, the proposed
schemes acheive the following privacy features.
1) Users’ anonimity. By using anonymous signature, TOS
can learn that a received ridesharing request/offer is
sent by a legitimate user without learning his/her iden-
tity. Also, by hiding the users’ locations, the TOS cannot
identify the users from the locations they visit.
2) Offers/requests matching. Users and eavesdroppers can-
not match drivers’ offers to riders’ requests. Only the
TOS can match the ridesharing offers and requests
because the TOS needs to use its secrets as indicated
in Equation (3) and (6).
3) Forward and backward privacy: By frequently changing
the cells’ identifiers, the TOS cannot collect side infor-
mation by matching the indices sent by the users at a
given time to the past or future indices.
4) Requests-users un-linkability. Given different ridesharing
requests sent from one user at different times, TOS
cannot learn if these requests are sent from the same
user or not.
5) Driver-rider pair un-linkability. If one rider shares a ride
with one driver, our schemes do not leak any infor-
mation that can help the TOS to identify the driver-
rider pair when they share rides in the future. This is
because of the use of anonymous signature and because
the trip’s encrypted data cannot be matched to old data
due to changing the cells’ identifiers.
6) Same request un-linkability. The encrypted requests of the
same trip look different when encrypted at different
times even if they have the same trip information.
This is due to the random numbers used in the kNN
encryption scheme to encrypt the requests.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
5.1 Experiment Setup
The proposed schemes were implemented using MATLAB,
and a server with an Intel® Xeon® Processor E5-2420
@2.2GHZ (2 processors) and 32 GB RAM. In our experi-
ments, we used real maps to create a set of trips extracted
from the map. First, we used OpenStreetMap project [29] to
get a real map for the city of Nashville, TN, USA as shown
in Figure 1. The ridesharing area is 75.5 km × 33 km. This
area is divided into 15,687 cells with a cell size of 400 m
× 400 m. We used SUMO program [30] to create real and
random routes for 450 users. All the reported results are
averaged over 30 different runs. In NRS, the Bloom filter
size is computed to be 2,048 bits such that the false positive
probability is at most 0.01 assuming at most 60 cells are in
trip routes. In TRS, the time component ` is represented by
different numbers of bits that are between 25 and 200, while
48 bits are used for NRS.
5.2 Non-transferable ridesharing organization
5.2.1 Performance Metrics
Three performance metrics are used for comparison and
assessment between our NRS scheme and the proposed
scheme in the literature, complete city representation-based
scheme(CCRS) [20].
1) Search time: The time needed by TOS to organize shared
rides.
2) Computation overhead: The time needed by the diver,
rider, and TOS to run NRS scheme. Since the users
send their requests/offers using their mobile phones
that may have low computational power, reducing the
computation overhead on the users is desirable.
3) Communication overhead: The amount of data transmit-
ted during the communication between the users and
the TOS.
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Fig. 9: Search time versus number of riders’ requests.
TABLE 2: Computation overhead.
CCRS NRS
Modified kNN Key generation 198.42 sec 2.7 sec
Encryption Scheme Index generation 1.26 sec 0.15 sec
5.2.2 Experiment Results
Computation Overhead. Table 2 summarizes the computa-
tion overhead results of NRS versus CCRS. For the modified
kNN encryption scheme, the secret key generation takes
198.4 sec for CCRS and 2.7 sec per user for our scheme. For
encryption, the computation of an encrypted request takes
1.26 sec for CCRS and 0.15 sec for our scheme. Note that,
the data vector in NRS is much shorter than that of CCRS,
this because the driver’s route in CCRS is represented by a
vector with size equal to the total number of cells in the city.
However in NRS, only route cells identifiers are added to
the Bloom filter to be encrypted. Hence, NRS requires less
time for inner product operations in comparison to CCRS.
Search Time. Figure 9 gives the search time in mil-
liseconds versus the number of requests. Two cases are
considered. In the first case, the driver intends to share rides
with only one rider. In the second case, driver intends to
share ride with up to three riders. We also assumed that the
driver’s preferences are MP/MD, MP/RD, and MP/ED in
order.
The figure shows that the search time in our scheme can be
less than half that of CCRS. From the figure, when the number
of requests is 50, 150 and 300, NRS achieves a 50%, 60%
and 65% reduction, respectively compared to CCRS. This
reduction can be attributed to the fact that in CCRS all the
15,687 cells must be represented in the pick-up, drop-off and
route vectors with 15,687 bits for each vector, while in NRS,
only the cells of pick-up/drop-off and routes are added to
Bloom filters with a much smaller size. Consequently, CCRS
requires more time for inner product operations to match
users encryption to organize rides. The figure also shows
that an increase in the number of rider requests increases
the search time in the two schemes, but compared to CCRS,
NRS requires much less search time.
Communication Overhead. Figure 10 gives the commu-
nication overhead in KB versus the number of cells in the
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ridesharing area. It compares CCRS to NRS with 0.1 and
0.01 false positive probabilities. As shown in the figure,
for small cities with around 3,000 cells, both schemes have
close communication overhead. However, the communica-
tion overhead of CCRS increases linearly with the city size
while our scheme maintains almost a fixed overhead. This
can be attributed to the fact that in CCRS all the city cells
are represented in binary vector before encryption, but in
our scheme only the pick-up, drop-off and route cells are
stored in the Bloom filter. Note that, the number of cells
can be increased by either increasing the city size or using
finer grained cells for the same city for more accurate match-
ing. Figure 10 also illustrates that less false positive rate
requires more communication overhead because the size of
the Bloom filter should increase, but, the communication
overhead required of NRS is still much less than that of
CCRS. Figure 11 gives the communication overhead for
both CCRS and NRS versus the false positive probability
of the Bloom filter. As shown in the figure, CCRS has a
constant communication overhead since it is free of the false
positive probability of the Bloom filter. However for NRS,
as the Bloom filter size decreases (lower communication
overhead), the false positive probability increases.
Although the false positive probability can be signifi-
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TABLE 3: Computation Overhead.
Operation Time
User Key Generation 39.80 ms
Request Index Generation 0.06 ms
Modified kNN Route Index Generation 10.30 ms
Encryption Scheme Building Graph with 30 offers 2.33 sec
Dijkstra’s Search for one request 0.29 sec
cantly reduced with acceptable communication overhead,
the reliability of NRS can be increased more by returning
two or three results to reduce the chance of failure. Note
that, the failure probability can be reduced exponentially,
e.g., 0.1R and 0.01R in case of 0.1 and 0.01 false positive
probabilities, where R is the number of returned riders.
5.3 Transferable ridesharing organization
5.3.1 Performance Metrics
Three performance metrics are used for the evaluation of
TRS.
1) Vehicle service rate (SR). The average number of different
requests that each driver can serve.
2) Ridesharing success rate. The percentage of served rider
requests to the total number of requests.
3) User’s preference success rate. Percentage of satisfied re-
quests based on the type of search preferences specified
by users.
5.3.2 Experimental Results and Discussion
Table 3 summarizes the computation overhead of our
scheme. The required time to generate the secret key for each
user to be used in the modified kNN encryption scheme
is 39.80 ms. It is also worth mentioning that the keys can
be used for a long period of time. For encryption, each
driver takes on average 10.30 ms to compute I(r)D . On the
other hand, the rider takes on average 0.06 ms to encrypt
a request. This time is shorter than route index generation
because the rider generates only the encryption of the pick-
up and drop-off location. For the TOS, the graph building of
30 offers takes 2.33 sec and Dijkstra’s search for one request
takes 0.29 sec.
Figure 12 shows the average SR versus the number of
requests, with a different number of offers (30 and 50), and
studying two rider’s preferences (with and without trans-
fer). We assume that the maximum number of users that can
share a ride in the same vehicle is 5. The resolution of the
bits of the trip time is set to 25 bits. The searching preference
used in this figure is the Minc. It can be seen that the SR
of the TRS is about double that of the NRS. This indicates
that more users can be served in transferable services. In
addition, it shows that the SR increases as the number of
requests increases. Also, as the number of requests increases,
each vehicle can serve more than its actual capacity as many
riders share a ride for only a part of the driver’s route.
However, in NRS, the situation is different since the riders’
requests should match only one driver’s trip data, the SR
is decreased. This assure the idea that transferable service
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Fig. 12: Vehicle service rate (SR) versus the number of
requests for NRS and TRS given different numbers of offers.
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Fig. 13: Ridesharing success rate for 30 requests as the
number of offers increases.
can improve each vehicle occupancy, hence, improves the
ridesharing utilization.
Figure 13 shows the ridesharing success rate versus the
number of offers in case of 30 requests. The maximum
number of users in each vehicle is 5 users. The figure shows
that the ride sharing success rate increases with the increase
of the number of offers. Also, it is shown that if the number
of offers is 330, the ride sharing success rate is 91% for
TRS while it is only 62% for NRS. This also proves that
transferable service can improve ridesharing success rate,
and hence, improves the ridesharing utilization.
Figure 14 gives the effect of the time resolution (in
number of bits) on the SR of the vehicle. In this figure,
we use TRS with Minc preference and different number
of requests (150 and 300). As shown in the figure, it can be
seen that the increase of the number of time bits decreases
the SR of the vehicle. This is because with more time bits,
i.e, high resolution, each bit is associated to a shorter period,
which decreases the chance of matching offers and requests.
Figure 15 gives the success rate of the different search
preferences used in our scheme. In this figure, we used
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30 random requests for each search preference. It can be
seen that adding more constrains to the search preference,
e.g., cases Minc,t, Maxc,t, and (Minc,Maxt), reduces the
ridesharing success rate, whereas search with a flexible
transferable options, has more overall ridesharing success
rate.
5.4 Comparison between NRS and TRS
Figure 16 gives the communication overhead of NRS versus
TRS using different number of cells to represent the trip
data of the driver. For NRS, the driver needs to send vectors
for pick-up, drop-off, and route which are represented by
Bloom filters with false positive probabilities less than 0.003
and 0.05 . For TRS, the driver needs to send a vector of size
2k + ` bits for each cell on its route. From the figure, as the
number of cells in the driver route increases, TRS exhibits
a linear communication overhead, because the driver has to
send the individual cells in its route for the TOS to build the
directed graph. On the other hand, NRS exhibits a ladder
steps behavior, due to using Bloom filters where as more
cells are added to the filter as the number of cells increases,
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Fig. 16: The communication overhead of NRS and TRS.
and thus the filter size should increase in a non-linear
behavior to maintain the same false positive probability.
From Figure 16, although TRS scheme can organize non-
transferable shared rides like NRS, it has greater communi-
cation overhead than NRS. Therfore, it is more efficent to
use NRS if users need non-transferable ridesharing service.
The trade-off between the communication overhead and the
false positive probability for NRS is shown in the figure.
5.5 Comparison with existing schemes
We compare the performance of our schemes, NRS and
TRS, with existing schemes: FICA [31] and ORide [26].
The following metrics are used for the compution over-
head comparison: (1) computation time to generate riders’
requests; (2) computation time to generate drivers’ offers;
and (3) computation time for the ride sharing matching. For
comparing the communication cost, the following metrics
are used: (1) communication overhead for riders’ requests;
and (2) communication overhead for drivers’ offers.
From Figures 17a, 17b and 17c, we can see that our
scheme TRS outperforms other schemes in riders’ rideshar-
ing request, drivers’ ridesharing offers and ride matching
computation overhead. In addition, our TRS scheme offers
a transferable service which is not offered in FICA or Oride.
Although, NRS requires more time to compute the rider’s
request or driver’s offer compared with other schemes,
it gives the lowest computation overhead in ridesharing
matching operation. As shown in Figure 17c, our schemes
outperform other existing schemes in the computation over-
head required for matching the riders’ requests with the
drivers’ offers.
From Figure 17d, we can see that our schemes NRS
and TRS outperform other schemes in the communication
overhead for sending the rider’s request. For NRS, each
rider sends only the encrypted bloom filter which is shorter
than the actual vector that stores the whole cells in the
ridesharing area. For TRS, each rider only sends his/her
pick-up and drop-off locations to request a shared ride.
From Figure 17e, we can see that our scheme NRS out-
performs other schemes in communication overhead of the
driver’s offer. However, TRS requires more communication
overhead due to sending the whole route cell by cell to the
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Fig. 17: Performance analysis.
server to generate the directed graph and enable our unique
transferable service.
6 RELATED WORK
Recently, research in secure and privacy-preserving schemes
for ride-hailing [21], [25], [26], [32] and ridesharing (car-
pooling) services [15]–[21] is gaining much attention. Ride-
hailing services are motivated by offering high-quality
transportation means with affordable cost (e.g., Uber and
Lyft). It aims to match the riding requests offered by a set
of riders to a nearby driver in a real-time fashion through a
TOS. On the other hand, ridesharing services are motivated
by the expected reduction in traffic congestion, pollution,
and cost when different car owners offer to share their trips
with other passengers.
Oblivious privacy-preserving ride-hailing services were
introduced in [25], [26]. A scheme, called PrivateRide, is pro-
posed in [25] to provide anonymous ride-hailing services.
In [26], a scheme called Oride is proposed to improve Pri-
vateRide by adding accountability and enhanced privacy by
increasing the anonymity set for the number of rides from
the same area on the same day. In addition, Oride enables
the TOS to revoke any misbehaving riders or drivers. How-
ever, in both PrivateRide and Oride schemes, the TOS has to
send to the rider the Euclidean distances for all the drivers
so that he can pick the one with the minimum distance
which incurs a high communication overhead. Wang et al.
[21] proposed a privacy-preserving ride-hailing scheme that
divides the ridesharing area recursively into quad regions
stored into a quadtree. However, each user needs to send
an encryption for each region in the map to report his/her
location, which incurs a high communication overhead.
In summary, ride-hailing solutions only aim to connect a
rider to the closest driver which is insufficient for rideshar-
ing service due to the fixed route associated with each driver
in the latter service. Besides, unlike previous techniques, in
this paper, we used light cryptography to preserve location
privacy where the location’s cell can be fine-grained with
acceptable overhead.
For ridesharing services, meeting points determination
has been investigated in [18] and [16]. In these schemes, the
drivers distributed over a given city using the k-anonymity
model aiming to provide good coverage while preserving
the riders’ privacy. Nevertheless, the fixed pick-up points
may require the driver to take a detour from his intended
path while picking up or dropping off riders. Moreover,
as the level of anonymity increases in these schemes, it
becomes more challenging to ensure coverage. Optimal as-
signment for drivers and riders pairs based on global system
parameters has been addressed in [19] and [17]. Ridesharing
matching based on secure multi-party computation has been
addressed in [17] and [15]. However, all these schemes incur
high computation overhead and can not be used to organize
transferable rides.
The closest work in the literature to this paper is the
schemes proposed in [20] and [31]. In [20] and [31], they
address only non-transferable ridesharing service In [20], a
scheme called CCRS has been proposed, where users (both
riders and drivers) obscure their trips’ data from the TOS
by using kNN encryption scheme. The TOS matches the
ciphertext of the users and connects the users that can share
rides. In [31], a scheme called FICA has been proposed.
FICA is secure under a threat model where the cloud server
and road side units (RSUs) are semi-honest. FICA uses an
anonymous authentication scheme to authenticate users and
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recover malicious users’ real identities. In addition, the pro-
posed scheme built a private blockchain into the carpooling
system to record carpooling records for data auditability.
Unlike CCRS and FICA, this paper proposes two
schemes for non-transferable and transferable services. The
proposed schemes represent the user’s route data more
efficiently than CCRS, where CCRS represents the whole
city cells inside the route vector, setting only the user’s route
cells to one. However, in the proposed schemes, every cell
has an identifier and the user’s route vector encompasses
only these identifiers, hence, efficient matching operations.
Moreover, in CCRS, all the riders share the same encryption
key, which is less secure. In our schemes, each user has its
own key for encryption. Different from existing schemes,
this work can either be applied to carpooling services or
ride-hailing services. In addition, the proposed schemes
offer flexible services selections to both riders and drivers,
which requires the TOS to perform several operations over
encrypted data. In particular, we leverage Dijkstra shortest
path algorithm to offer transferable ridesharing service,
where a rider can transfer between drivers during his/her
trip. This can increase ridesharing utilization without de-
grading users’ privacy.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an efficient privacy-preserving
ridesharing organization schemes for transferable and non-
transferable ridesharing services. In NRS, drivers’ trip data
and riders’ requests are compactly stored in Bloom filters
which are then encrypted using the modified kNN encryp-
tion scheme. Then, TOS can perform similarity measure-
ment over encrypted data to connect each rider with only
one driver. In TRS, individual cells of each driver’s trip
data are encrypted using modified kNN encryption scheme,
and the ciphertexts are sent to the TOS. The TOS uses the
drivers’ trip data to create an encrypted directed graph for
ridesharing organization. Riders’ preferences are used to
determine the weights of the graph’s edges. Then, a modi-
fied Dijkstra scheme is used by the TOS to organize shared
rides by searching the directed graph. Our privacy analysis
demonstrates that the proposed schemes can preserve users
location privacy, trips data privacy, and identity anonymity.
Our experimental results on a real map demonstrate that the
proposed schemes are efficient and can be used to organize
shared rides in case of large cities. Moreover, the results in-
dicate that NRS requires less communication overhead than
the TRS. Nevertheless, TRS offers a flexible service that can
increase ridesharing utilization, whereas, NRS provides an
efficient and useful service for elderly and disabled people
who do not prefer to transfer between different drivers.
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